The internationalization of China's Renminbi will be a game changer to the global finance and politics, and its success thus far has been evidenced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s recent move to include the currency in its SDR basket. This scheme provides a unique opportunity to reflect on the very nature of law and finance and calls into question the conventional understanding of how financial institutions function: Why has authoritarian China, with its peculiar market settings, been able to make rapid progress in internationalizing its currency? This article applies the theory of macroprudential policy to examine the scheme's viability, timeline, and impacts. It argues that currency internationalization does not only depend on market forces but also requires strong state-led actions at critical junctures to reset the institutional equilibrium. China has taken advantage of its extra-large economy by carrying out fragmented but coherent institutional engineering, and adopting an institutional bridging approach for amplifying the effects. However, systemic risks inherent in China's banking system have been triggered by the project's international success due to its aggressive timeline and procyclical nature. In this regard, this scheme has wrongly pitched itself as an international project rather a domestic one. As a responsible issuer of a major international currency, China has to re-align the project to focus on domestic institutions macroprudentially, with special caution paid to any attempt to pursue the prestige normally conferred upon such issuers, including extraterritoriality and export of institutional designs overseas.
I. INTRODUCTION The internationalization of the Renminbi (RMB) is a game changer that could revolutionize the world of finance, global regulatory regimes, and legal practices. For China, the advantages of the RMB internationalization scheme (the Scheme), which aims to enable the RMB to be widely used as an international settlement, investment, markets by altering price signals to counteract market tendencies) and 'market levers' (i.e. magnifying private markets and boosting their potential to produce public benefits). 8 Currency internationalization does not only depend on market forces and strong demand for the currency in question, but also requires strong state-led actions at critical junctures to rebalance the existing institutional equilibrium.
Since it launched the Scheme in the early 2010s, Beijing has demonstrated its strong political commitment to the Scheme by reconfiguring its economic structure in what is called 'state capitalism'. Several new international financial institutions and initiatives to facilitate the implementation of the Scheme have been launched. These include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS Development Bank, 9 and the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative. The People's Bank of China (PBC), China's central bank, is also willing to trade its strong grip on foreign exchange rates for the better capital flows necessary for the success of the Scheme. 10 A PBC official noted that the PBC's policy choices have been made under the classical macroeconomics notion of the 'impossible trinity', 11 a trilemma which suggests that every central bank can only choose two of the three policy options to implement simultaneously: fixed exchange rate, free capital flow, and independent monetary policy. 12 The PBC has elected for the latter two and is willing to let go of the first. 13 The consequences of these sophisticated policy considerations have been tremendous. Christine Lagarde, the IMF's managing director, stated that their decision to include the RMB in the SDR basket was made on the basis that the RMB is 'widely used' and 'freely usable', which constitutes two major criteria for the inclusion of any currency in the SDR basket. 14 The remarkable success of the Scheme thus far has challenged several orthodoxies about currency internationalization. The IMF's decision is an important milestone for the Scheme. Yet, the RMB is 'freely usable' but not 'fully convertible', thus allegedly subject to exchange rate manipulation from time to time, and remains under the political control of the mighty Chinese Communist Party which has vowed to resist the influence of the 'hostile western forces'. 15 This section analyzes China's approaches for internationalizing the RMB by examining the unorthodox progress of the Scheme against varying theories about the institutional conditions necessary for internationalization of a currency.
A. Main obstacles
The main obstacles to the Scheme lie at home rather than abroad, although the Chinese general public often consider oppositely. Any international reserve currency requires full convertibility. Yet, strict capital controls, a characteristic of China's banking and financial systems, would render full convertibility impossible. 16 Although capital controls have constrained free capital flow and limited firms' investment opportunities, it serves as a financial firewall between international financial markets and China's domestic markets. China's tight capital controls enabled its economy to survive the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial CrisisÀand even turned the latter to its advantage. 17 To internationalize the RMB, China would have to lift this financial firewall to introduce full convertibility. According to the original timetable, it was set to be the year 2020. 18 Unfortunately, the liberalization of capital accounts is not without its dangers. This is arguably the most important challenge for the Scheme.
Historically, premature lifting of capital controls has had catastrophic effects on emerging markets. 19 Capital account liberalization would subject domestic markets to volatile global economy and speculative attacks. 20 Foreign capital, including hot money, could flow freely into the country at issue, and domestic capital could flow out easily as well. 21 While a sudden inflow of speculative money may create investment bubbles in the absence of deep capital markets, capital flights may lead to a domestic credit crunch. 22 During a series of crises in Europe (e.g. Iceland, Ireland, and Greece) following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, free capital flow led to asset bubbles in emerging markets and allowed speculative investors to quickly pull their money out before bubbles burst. 23 The IMF and the World Bank, once the champions of capital account liberalization, have since suggested that a certain level of capital controls may be desirable. 24 China's uneven market development could amplify potential risks from lifting capital controls. For one, capital controls will expose domestic financial institutions to fierce competition with foreign capital. After years of protection, the capacity of China's stateowned banks varies. Banks in major cities may be better equipped than those in peripheral cities in their capacity to evaluate borrowers' creditworthiness, assess their own risk exposure, and develop diverse and competitive revenue sources. Cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, where firms and individuals are used to competitive market practices, may benefit from the open policies brought by the Scheme, but the peripheral provinces may not. Similarly, more sophisticated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large private firms may benefit from the scheme, but small-and mid-sized companies that focus on domestic rather than export markets might not.
Complications may also arise from domestic political struggles. Governmental agencies aligned with SOEs, such as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), have apparently been less cooperative and more skeptical about the Scheme because deregulation and liberalization would reduce their authority within China's bureaucratic system.
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After all, institutional structures are self-reinforcing and would promote path dependence as expectations and preferences solidify around the status quo. 26 As such, rather than focusing on the progress of the Scheme in the global arena, Beijing needs to focus domestically on overhauling its banking and financial systems before exposing these domestic institutions to fiercer competition and larger market risks as a result of RMB's full convertibility. However, conventional theories have raised various doubts as to whether China is able to carry out such prerequisite reforms for the Scheme.
B. Conventional theories
The RMB's rapid ascendance to the status of a global reserve currency may seem strange when considered against the existing literature about international currency. There are two main strands of literature; each focuses on a different cluster of institutions as prerequisites for any currency aiming to attain international reserve currency status. These theories emphasize the importance of accountability, transparency, and market institutions, thereby casting varying levels of doubt about the prospect of the Scheme.
The first strand of literature emphasizes that only countries with advanced capitalist economies can make their currency international reserve currency. Full currency convertibility and deep capital markets are crucial prerequisites for currency internationalization. 28 The former allows both foreign and domestic investors to freely convert currency, whereas the latter helps channel capital inflow into various investment markets rather than speculative areas. Both prerequisites rest on institutions that are only available in a mature capitalist economy, including market transparency, a solid financial sector, good corporate governance, and effective law enforcement.
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From this perspective, China has made rapid progress, but remains behind other major economies. Numerous problems have been documented, including the lack of integrated market supervision, poor credit ratings, prevailing insider trading, and lax enforcement of corporate governance rules. 30 According to this market-centric thesis, unless China streamlines its state-private relationship, strengthens its banking sector, and improves its corporate and capital market regulations, the premature introduction of full currency convertibility for the sake of the Scheme would Internationalization of RMB 37 eventually harm China's economy due to the increase in risk exposure and regulatory arbitrage. The second strand of theories focuses on political stability and accountability as an indicator of the country's monetary system, fiscal and budget regulations, stateprivate sector relationship, and overall political economy. 31 As this polity-centric thesis suggests, international investors would not pour their assets into a currency that is vulnerable to political pressure and financial manipulation. Such vulnerabilities would become a pressing concern during an economic crisis in a nondemocratic country whose legitimacy relies on economic performance rather than political accountability, potentially forcing the state to rescue its economy at the expense of foreign investors. Since the early nineteenth century, the leading international currencies (i.e. British pound, the USD, Japanese yen, Swiss Franc, euro) have been issued by democratic countries that have built a durable political climate, where there are constraints on the executive, and creditors are well-represented. 32 This polity-centric theory does not require China to become a democracy, but it does suggest that significant political reforms to introduce more transparency and accountability are necessary for the Scheme to succeed.
Both market-and polity-centric theories are skeptical about the Scheme and suggest that the RMB is unlikely to become a prominent reserve currency, at least not in the near future. 33 However, China, an authoritarian country without sound market institutions, seems to have succeeded against the odds and achieved tremendous progress in internationalizing the RMB thus far. This article in the following two sections suggests that two factors, one endogenous (i.e. the large-scale economy) and the other exogenous (i.e. modern financial engineering such as currency swap agreements), are absent from current analysesÀbut explain the Scheme's unexpected success.
C. Leveraging China's large-scale market and institutional bridging There has been little discussion of an endogenous factor critical to China's economic developmentÀits extraordinarily large-scale economy. The size of an economy is usually depicted as an indicator of varying determinants for a prominent reserve currency, rather than a determinant in its own right. 34 This probably reflects the reality of the financial world to date: while the USA, Japan and the European Union have immense markets that are vital for maintaining the USD, yen, and euro, the Swiss Franc is a prominent reserve currency issued by a small economy with less than half of the population of Shanghai alone. China's massive markets have played a critical role in the Scheme's unorthodox achievements. A large-scale domestic market generally promises better currency liquidity, which is necessary for any international reserve currency. 35 As a rule of thumb, the larger the market is, the more liquid a currency is. That said, China's heterogenic large-scale economy is a poor fit for any standardized, unitary approach.
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This has compelled Beijing to impart novel and pragmatic approaches to coping with its highly fragmented and unevenly developed economy. The internationalization of the RMB provides a perfect opportunity to observe how China's home-ground size advantage plays out in the process of formulating and implementing specific policies.
For example, due to long-lasting capital controls through which Beijing segregates markets to better control capital flow, the RMB's liquidity has been fragmented between onshore and offshore markets, as well as among multiple offshore RMB centers. 37 Commentators argue that liquidity fragmentation complicates RMB settlement procedure and increases the cost of switching to the new RMB settlement platform. 38 For example, while USD-based payments are routed to New York to be settled in seconds, RMB payments made in London to Hong Kong have to be cleared in both places according to their respective procedures. This process may take hours or even days and would increase risk exposure and impede currency liquidity. 39 However, this fragmentation does not seem to be detrimental. China's liquidity fragmentation is generally manageable and could be addressed through financial technologies providing solutions for cross-process coordination. In October 2015, China launched the China International Payment System (CIPS) to mimic the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) at New York as a one-stop, cross-border, inter-bank settlement platform. Within less than two years, nearly 300 financial institutions have participated in CIPS.
40 CIPS has also partnered with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), the banking consortium that facilitates trillions of dollars in international transactions on a daily basis. CIPS thus bridges liquidity at each of the hubs and settlement centers, which would ultimately unleash China's advantage in RMB liquidity, both onshore and Internationalization of RMB 39
offshore. As such, China's extremely large domestic market and its combined liquidity can offset the RMB settlement costs across fragmented markets. China has further engaged in an institutional bridging approach to amplify the size advantage of its large but fragmented markets. This approach aims to link regional markets with their counterparts within or outside the country to create significant aggregated effects. This bridging strategy is markedly different from a universal deregulation of financial systems and liberalization of capital accounts, but results in similar outcomes in terms of liquidity enhancement. In addition to CIPS, other examples include the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect launched in November 2014, which allows domestic Chinese investors in Shanghai Stock Exchange and international investors in Hong Kong Stock Exchange to trade and settle shares in each other's market. 41 In December 2016, the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect was also launched, with China-Hong Kong Bond Connect launched in 2017. 42 In the future, China may then proceed to link these markets to Singapore, and from there to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) markets in the south, as well as to the Taiwan Stock Exchange in the east.
Another case in point is the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) program. The RQFII allows foreign institutional investors to invest offshore RMB directly in Chinese onshore markets and repatriate their investments in either RMB or other foreign currencies. 43 In this way, the RQFII is a crucial bridging mechanism that aims to recycle offshore RMB back to China to stimulate economic growth. Similar programs catering to varying groups of investors include the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). 44 By controlling capital flows in and out of China, these specialized programs function as carefully constructed passages through China's 'great wall' of capital controls that connect onshore and offshore markets. After all, institutional bridging can only be effective in a large economy like China's, where the outcomes, however controlled, can nonetheless create significant economies of scale.
China's extra-large markets also enable the Chinese government to conduct large-scale institutional experiments. To create a basic infrastructure for facilitating and regulating RMB flows, China needs to streamline its highly regulated and subsidy-dependent banking system, which comes with its own set of dangers given that many interest groups would be affected. 45 The PBC's solution is to create 41 In theory, China has a number of models to choose from for bridging domestic and foreign stock exchanges, including secondary listing, cross listing, and a national security market model used by US regulators to link the European and the US markets. multiple free trade zones to experiment with the liberalized banking and financial environments necessary for the Scheme. The Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) is a good example of this. Established in 2013, the SFTZ has experimented with various forms of deregulation, the most important being the lifting of capital controls and privatization of the banking sector. 46 Private banks have been allowed to incorporate in the SFTZ, and foreign banks are permitted to provide full services within the zone. 47 Residents in the SFTZ are also permitted to borrow the RMB overseas from offshore financial institutions, but can only use such RMB loans within the SFTZ. 48 The SFTZ serves as a safe 'sandbox' environment that can contain any potential risks from these unprecedented deregulations of China's financial sector. Measures with a proven track record in the SFTZ have been subsequently implemented nationwide. 49 Due to its large domestic market, China's institutional experiments are not only wide but also pluralist, including one characteristic of 'pluralist capitalism'. The SFTZ is modeled on Singapore's state capitalism model, where the state leads the market by operating in a fairly free and competitive manner. The other leading RMB zoneÀ'Qianhai Pilot Zone'Àmimics Hong Kong, a classic laissez-faire economy.
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With both models of capitalist economy in place, Beijing has not been shy about its ambition to attract Singaporean firms and investors to the SFTZ, and have SFTZ to compete with (if not replace) Singapore. The same is true of the Qianhai Pilot Zone, which has been designed to attract capital and talents from neighboring Hong Kong. Cathay United Bank, another foreign bank from Taiwan, also incorporated its local branch office, which is not subject to any limit on foreign exchange or the uses of the capital that it lends for cross-border trading purposes within the SFTZ. In short, China possesses the free market institutions emphasized in the prevailing literature at the regional level and within its pilot free trade zones, although these institutions may not presently exist at the national level. While such institutions might be limited to designated areas, China's bridging approach helps leverage its enormous market to cope with important issues, including the RMB's fragmented liquidity under current capital controls.
D. Bilateral currency swap agreements
No currency can become a widely used international reserve currency without being fully convertible. While the IMF has recognized the RMB as 'freely usable', the RMB is not yet 'fully convertible'. To overcome this obstacle while keeping preexisting capital controls in place, China has deployed an innovative strategy based on soft law and a network of bilateral agreements that connect onshore and offshore markets. This has come in the form of currency swaps, a mechanic of financial engineering that has existed in the financial world for decades.
Inspired by the Federal Reserve's (Fed) use of bilateral swaps to rescue the global financial system during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 52 China has created an intensive, global network of RMB swap lines to implement the Scheme soon thereafter. As of the end of 2016, 32 countries have reached a swap agreement with the PBC. Under the swap structure, a foreign central bank can opt for a swap of its currency with the RMB offered by the PBC under mutually agreed terms, amounts, and a timeline to swap back. Functionally, the swap agreement serves as a mechanism for providing RMB liquidity outside of China. 53 This bilateral swap framework provides a controllable, ad hoc channel to increase the RMB liquidity in designated foreign countriesÀa more palatable option than lifting capital controls altogether. Foreign entities may acquire the swapped RMB from the central bank of the country where they are located for settling international transactions purchasing RMB-denominated financial products, while foreign central banks may also use the RMB obtained to stabilize their currencies or boost foreign reserve. 54 Although China borrowed the notion of credit swaps from the Fed, it has applied it in a very different way. 55 The swap agreements between foreign countries and the Fed as the lender of last resort resemble an insurance arrangement against the risks of 52 The Fed created emergency credit lines with fourteen central banks of leading economies, providing nearly $600 billion in financing to economies starved of USD, in an effort to prevent credit freezes in foreign banks holding large amounts of dollar assets. This measure successfully prevented a 'domino effect' in the international money markets and re-assured the status of the USD as a global reserve currency. ; and (3) they de-dollarize commonly accepted swap structures and occur only directly between the RMB and local currencies. 61 Notably, crisis-related swap lines mainly act as a safety net to avoid volatility and are rarely activated.
62 They are also usually conditioned upon the acceptance of conditionality, which are linked with the IMF in one way or another due to the IMF's capacity for economic surveillance. In comparison, RMB swaps take place on regular basis under the terms agreed between China and its counterparty rather than the IMF's conditionality. They do not piggyback on the IMF's regional surveillance and are therefore not linked with the IMF's conditionality. 63 In fact, RMB swaps serve more wide-ranging objectives as opposed to other existing swap arrangements. They not only help with dealing with financial stress in countries involved but, more importantly, promote trade and investment in RMB as well.
64 While China's swap agreement with South Korea aims to strengthen the credit ability of Korean firms in China that need to borrow locally, China's agreement with Hong Kong is intended to increase liquidity of the RMB in its global hub of offshore RMB-denominated bonds. 65 China's agreement with Argentina aims to promote the RMB as the payment and settlement currency for trades between China and Argentina. 66 The varying aims of these arrangements are also reflected in the fact that all RMB swaps have longer terms (e.g. three years) than swaps set up by other central banks to merely address market liquidity strains (e.g. thirty days). 67 Argentina's recent exercise of the swap option revealed the influence of the RMB swaps. Argentina has been short of USD to service foreign debt and to stabilize the Argentine Peso due to its credit defaults and resulting difficulties in obtaining USD from the global finance market. The government has solved this by utilizing its RMB swap accord and immediately converting the resulting RMB to USD. 68 Here, the swap functions like a loan facility and the swapped currency itself (i.e. Argentine Peso) serves as a collateral for the PBC. As Argentina needs to return the same amount of the RMB within an agreed term, it has to accumulate sufficient RMB. This brings the spillover effects of RMB swaps into play: Argentina would need to invite Chinese investments, urge Argentine firms to accept the RMB as payment for foreign trades, and increase trade with China. This not only advances RMB internationalization, but also gives Chinese firms a competitive advantage in Argentina.
The functionality of the RMB swaps demonstrates the wisdom of the PBC's decision to use currency swaps as a strategic tool for implementing the Scheme. With capital controls functioning as an ultimate financial 'firewall', the swap mechanism can bypass capital controls in a controlled manner, as the PBC still has the final say as to whether to execute a swap requested by foreign central banks. Furthermore, in tandem with the increasing use of the RMB worldwide, RMB swap lines can also support the RMB exchange rate and shield the RMB against speculation and other market pressures by adjusting the RMB liquidity. 69 In this way, China's swap strategy resonates with Chris Brummer's proposalÀ'minilateralism' as opposed to conventional 'multilateralism'. 70 Swap agreements enable China to create an intensive network of bilateral arrangements based on informal collaboration without any explicitly binding international legal obligation, which could be understood as a 'soft law' alternative to the traditional 'hard law' commitments resulting from international treaties, rules, or formation of formal organizations. China's strategic application of swap agreements provides an institutional bypass for internationalizing the RMB without fully lifting capital controls. 71 In the foreseeable future, swap agreements are likely to play an increasingly vital role in facilitating RMB circulation offshore before the RMB is made fully convertible.
III. TIMELINE: RMB INTERNATIONALIZATION AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY The timeline for the internationalization of the RMB has been fiercely debated ever since the Scheme was launched. Beijing once released an ambitious timetable: to make the RMB fully convertible by 2020 and complete the Scheme by mid-2020s. 72 China's financial savvy with regards to the global capital market games seemed to support Beijing's confidence in the initial timetable. 73 However, some seasoned development economists outside China urged Beijing not to pursue an ambitious timetable that could potentially disrupt the proper sequence of financial reforms.
74 Such views were not taken seriously at the time. By 2011, according to an influential advisor to the PBC, the Scheme had assumed a formidable place 'at the heart of China's financial strategy'. 75 Market forces continued to drive the implementation of the Scheme as international investors and bankers complained about the slow pace of reformed and called for faster implementation. 76 However, a series of recent shocks in China's stock and foreign exchange markets has alarmed Beijing. In the summer of 2015, China faced the largest stock market crash since 1990s, with the Shanghai Composite Index losing almost 40% of the value in just a few weeks. The market crash led to an unexpected freefall in the RMB exchange rate and a shocking drop in foreign reserve due to the PBC's desperate intervention to save the RMB. Beijing took all possible measures to stop the crisis, with the PBC injecting massive amounts of capital to bolster the market, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) suspending stock trading to slow the crash. 77 79 Despite the Scheme's swift success overseas, it has been confronted with more challenges at home, where the RMB remains subject to volatile fluctuation from varying political and economic factors.
These shocks called into question the RMB's purported progress toward a safe haven currency. Policy makers realized the importance of recalibrating the timeline and regaining control over deregulation. A senior manager of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest state-owned bank in China, remarked that: 'It is the Chinese government that should decide the pace of RMB convertibilityÀnot HSBC, not foreigners, not Obama! Everything should be controllable, or we don't do it!' 80 This appears to be a move in the right direction, but the key question is whether this will be sufficient.
Arguably, Beijing made the mistake of pitching the Scheme as an international project instead of a domestic project. The Scheme cannot succeed without improving the capacity of China's domestic financial institutions. Beijing's overemphasis on the Scheme's global outcomes has distorted the sequence of necessary reforms at home, and is likely to destabilize China's banking and financial sectors, where systemic risks exist. This section does not propose an alternative timetable for the Scheme, but instead suggests the key factors that the timetable failed to take into considerationÀnamely, macroprudential policy. In fact, the Scheme is designed in a fashion that directly contradicts macroprudential policy.
A. From microprudential to macroprudential policies
What we witnessed in China's 2015/16 crisis clearly reflects the nature of systemic risksÀa crash in a single stock market across China's financial market, debt problems that led to an equity market crisis, and the liquidity freeze in the Chinese banking system which plunged the RMB into freefall in the exchange markets.
81 Some commentators blamed the overheating economy caused by the PBC's RMB 4 trillion (around 586 billion USD) stimulus package, while others blamed the Scheme for prematurely loosening-up capital controls and exposing Chinese markets to hot money and international speculative attacks. regulation served as the paradigm for financial regulation. It focuses on functionalities of individual institutions and markets that constitute the financial architecture, including principal functions such as capital provision, risk management, or information processing. 83 Microprudential policy generally relies on the 'let-the-market-dothe-work' regulatory paradigm, and presumes that financial institutions know where their risks lie, and how to mitigate their risk exposure more effectively than regulators. 84 It is less concerned with the interconnectedness between varying markets and institutions and the transmission of risks across sectors and markets.
In comparison, macroprudential policy is concerned with systemic risksÀrisks that derive from the interconnectedness between institutions and may bring down an entire financial system. Systemic risks are difficult to be identified and should not be understood as the sum of the risks posed by individual financial institutions. 85 Contagion happens when, for example, Bank A's default on loans borrowed from Bank B eventually affects healthy Bank C that holds debts issued by Bank B, regardless of Bank C's actual performance.
86 This is because of panic sale by the investors of Bank C, who begin to believe that Bank C's financials would be adversely affected by Bank B's loss. 87 Furthermore, the contemporary banking industry is inextricably interconnected and constantly changing; therefore, financial regulations would lag behind financial reality and thus spur regulatory arbitrage that increases systemic risks. 88 As systemic risks appear to be inevitable, macroprudential policy aims to preserve the financial system as a whole by limiting the triggers of systemic risks, breaking the transmission of resulting systemic shocks, and restraining their impact on the financial system. 89 However, complications may arise from the different nature and direction of these two strands of regulatory thinking. Regulations designed based on microprudential policy to address financial risks may paradoxically exacerbate systemic risks from 83 a macroprudential point of view. 90 The most infamous example of such unintended consequences is the risk-weighted requirements under Basel II influenced by microprudential policy. These requirements gave rise to banks' widespread use of financial engineering to reduce nominal risk, thereby resulting in loans and capital treatment that failed to accurately reflect the institutions' risk exposure to the underlying assets. 91 Maintaining financial stability thus requires a coordinated approachÀregulators of financial stability should not only be involved in the design of microprudential regulation, but integrated micro-level information collected by regulators should also be shared at the domestic and international level for the purpose of macroprudential policy.
92
B. Systemic risks and RMB internationalization Both paradigms of prudential policy thinking are crucial for the internationalization of the RMB in that financial stability, the ultimate objective of both, is a prerequisite for any international currency. Considering the systemic shocks that the Scheme has encountered, however, macroprudential policy is arguably more critical at the moment. Against this backdrop, the timeline of the Scheme needs to be evaluated against not just microprudential policy, but also the macroprudential point of view in terms of the country's capacity to prevent systemic shocks. Unfortunately, the current Scheme focuses on the former rather than the latter, and its timeline fails to incorporate the macroprudential perspective.
China has made great strides in reforming its banking sector and restructuring SOEs, the main clients of Chinese banks, but largely along the lines of conventional microprudential policy concerning corporate governance, disclosure systems, and credit rating and enhancement, among others. 93 By contrast, macroprudential policy considerations put greater emphasis on systemic risks, which could require the Scheme as well as its timeline for implementation to be reconfigured. For example, it might not be prudent for China, in pursuit of the Scheme's overseas success, to lift capital controls at such a fast pace before its domestic institutions are ready. Also, given the importance of reducing the number of 'too-big-to-fail' systemically important firms, Beijing needs to be careful when encouraging its 'national champion' SOEs to expand overseas and work hand in hand with the Scheme. 94 In light of recent literature suggesting that central banks should move away from a 'lender of last 90 Awrey, above n 87, at 91. resort' approach to an insurance scheme by requiring a premium from systemically important firms, 95 the PBC needs to reconsider its policy to continue providing free subsidies for China's SOEs and banks. By the same token, China needs to adjust the procyclical nature of the Scheme that aims to mainly attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) to support its economic growth. More specifically, in the field of securities regulations, China's potential move from a merit-based toward a disclosure-based regulatory regime, which has been recommended by reform-minded scholars based on microprudential policy, 96 might result in a flood of securities offerings that could worsen China's overheated securities market.
The forgoing considerations are not only concerned with the nature of the Scheme, but also the order of priority among varying policy initiatives. China has in fact applied certain macroprudential policy tools to its overall banking and finance reforms, 97 but the lack of similar considerations in the Scheme would seriously compromise the efficacy of preexisting macroprudential initiatives. In the following subsections, this article discusses three problematic aspects regarding the current timetable: (C) capital controls and (D) procyclicality, followed by (E) a case study of China's shadow banking.
C. Premature lifting of capital controls
When the Scheme was announced, a JP Morgan senior manager remarked privately that 'it is impossible for the RMB to become an international reserve currency for one simple reasonÀChina will not give up its control over its economy'. 98 As it turned out in the following years, he was wrong. Beijing appeared to be willing to push the RMB to the pinnacle as soon as possible, at the expense of subjecting its economy to global market forces by quickly lifting capital controls. However, quick returns come with high risks. The Scheme's aim to make the RMB fully convertible by 2020 raises concerns from a macroprudential perspective. As suggested, the timeline of the Scheme should have developed along the lines of identifying the proper sequence of domestic banking reforms, necessary for transforming China's banking system into one capable of supporting the fully convertibility of the RMB. China has relied on 'financial repression' to extract savings from private sectors and then allocate cheap capital to strategic industries, as was the case in several other successful economies in Asia. 
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The flip side of financial repression is the application of capital controls, which prevent capital from flowing out of the monetary pool to be extracted by the state. The failure to correctly identifying the necessary sequence of reforms to remove this 'financial repression' can trigger systemic risks, as evidenced by the financial turmoil in Latin America in the 1980s, including Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, where their currencies went into free fall after a floating exchange rate was introduced. The Scheme aims to aggressively boost the liquidity of the RMB by introducing several measures that would reconfigure the core of China's state capitalism. Most of these policies are concerned with the lifting of capital controls under the fast timeline, including liberalization of the RMB's exchange rate and state-owned banks' lending and savings rates. In fact, development economists have proposed a set of policy suggestions regarding the sequence of liberalization of capital controls and state banking systems in countries subject to financial repression.
Based on studies of developmental states, Ronald McKinnon has suggested that prudential fiscal controls should be introduced first to prevent the need for the government to cover deficits by increasing money supply. This is followed by domestic financial liberalization, which should begin with the liberalization of interest rates and end with the privatization of state-owned banks. 100 The privatization of banks comes later because market mechanisms should be introduced incrementally as state-owned banks need time to adjust to a competitive market. After domestic financial liberalization, the next step is to liberalize regulations targeting external and foreign sectors. Examples include the lifting of foreign exchange controls and import or export restrictions. 101 Finally, the capital account can be made fully convertible. Furthermore, the order of capital account liberalization should be as follows: capital inflow should be liberalized before capital outflow; long-term capital before short-term capital; direct investment prior to indirect investment; and capital of institutional investors before individuals. During the process, the government needs to use capital controls wisely but cannot depend on capital controls to compensate for poor economic management. 102 Several East Asian states largely followed this path to transform their financial system that were subject to financial repression. 103 One often cited example is Taiwan, which spent approximately fifteen years to complete this process for its banking sectorÀwhich was much smaller than China's. 104 The Scheme has accelerated, if not distorted, this proposed policy sequence. For one, fiscal controls in China remain problematic due to the stimulus package introduced in 2008, which has led to an apprehensive amount of governmental debts at the regional level. 105 Cash-rich SOEs and firms, as well as corrupt officials, drew cheap cash acquired domestically by taking advantage of capital flow liberalization. Consequently, capital account liberalization has led to an unprecedented amount of capital flight, which hit a record high at the end of 2016, as well as unexpected RMB depreciation over the course of 2015 and 2016. 106 This in turn created a credit crunch in domestic markets, leading to the burst of China's property bubble, as demonstrated by the numerous suspended real estate development projects across the country. 107 At the same time, mechanisms for hedging against counterparty's credit risks such as derivatives are rare and limited. 108 Furthermore, China's regulators failed to coordinate their activities effectively to address China's systemic issues. After 2015 stock market crisis, the chairman of the CSRC has been dismissed for alleged corruption, together with several top officials of other regulatory bodies removed for similar causes, including the Deputy Chairman of CSRC, the Chairman of China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and four officials of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). 109 Notably, CSRC, CIRC, and CBRC are the three highest regulatory bodies of China's capital markets, financial, and insurance sectors.
D. Procyclicality of the RMB internationalization
A major difference between microprudential and macroprudential thinking is that the former is procyclical while the latter is countercyclical. Procyclicality refers to the availability of cheap capital and loosely valued collateral in a booming economy, which encourages borrowers to borrow more from financial institutions. Financial institutions may in turn resort to credit default swaps to hedge against any increase in risks of default and thus assume that it is safe to lend more, thereby further fueling the economy that is booming and probably already over-heating. This feedback loop continues until the bubble bursts. 110 In comparison, macroprudential policy differs in that it is countercyclical and works by restraining borrowing especially when a procyclical build-up is occurring in a booming economy. Its emphasis is put on bad times when banks would find themselves exposed to poorly covered defaults owing to suddenly falling prices of assets and collaterals and, therefore, might be forced to reduce the book values of their assets to cover their sudden loss, and have difficulty in seeking fresh capital infusion due to credit crunch across markets. As the number of distressed banks rises, the less capital they can lend to needy companies, thereby amplifying the downward cycle.
The fact that the Scheme focuses on aiming to expand its international acceptance demonstrates its procyclical nature, which runs counter to the countercyclical nature that macroprudential policy emphasizes. In fact, the design of the Scheme is procyclical by nature. One of the overarching ideas underlying the Scheme is to increase the RMB's offshore reserve for investment purpose, and to recycle offshore RMB back to domestic markets to stimulate the economy. According to a senior attorney once involved in the formation of the Scheme, 'without recycling the offshore RMB back to China for investment, the RMB internationalization is meaningless'.
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Moreover, the Scheme's impressive achievements overseas are partially attributable to the PBC's procyclical, expansionary monetary policy after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Beijing's stimulus package greatly supported trade and investment by Chinese firms, both domestically and internationally, which in turn increased acceptance of the RMB worldwide as a settlement and investment currency. The stimulus package is widely perceived as the main cause of the quick increase in local government and SOE debts. 112 Chinese regulators have moved to restrict procyclical build-ups in areas such as foreign mergers and acquisition by Chinese firms. 113 China also amended its Budget Law in 2014 and issued a crucial policy guideline known as 'Document 43' to improve fiscal discipline and restrain off-budget debt of local governments such as bonds issued through special financing vehicles. 114 However, Beijing's concerns about such procyclicality build-ups do not seem to have been translated into the design of the Scheme.
The political agenda behind the Scheme has naturally led to an expedited timetable, with a focus on the international progress rather than domestic reforms. The Scheme is designed to be procyclical and its implementation also goes in parallel with procyclical market and institutional reforms. Skeptics against the Scheme have also demonstrated the path dependence of various procyclical policies, from which they had benefited and therefore worried that the Scheme would reduce such benefits or weaken their authority based on such procyclical policies (see Section II (A)).
Fortunately, Beijing seems to have learned a hard lesson from the 2015/16 stock crises and has reportedly slowed down the implementation of the Scheme in early 2017. The PBC has rightly recalibrated the liberalization of capital accounts and retightened up capital controls in early 2017 in certain areas (e.g. acquisition of foreign company assets and participation in real estate markets overseas) to stop capital flights. 115 But it remains to be seen if a macroprudential perspective will be incorporated into the Scheme. The next section offers a case study of the systemic risks hidden in China's shadow banking system. E. Systemic risks in context: shadow banking Systemic risks increase with the complexity and interconnectedness of firms and markets. We should therefore consider not only the causes of systemic risks, but also the transmission mechanisms of the adverse effects in a complex financial system. 116 Transmission mechanisms are most likely related to liquidity, leverage, losses, and the level of their linkages through the structures of firms, deals, and financial markets. 117 Here, a complication comes from the expanding shadow banking sector, which creates bank-like risks (e.g. maturity mismatch) resulting from their bank-like behavior. 118 In fact, the shadow bank maturity mismatch was at the core of 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 119 As such, this section offers a case study that reveals the systemic risks and their transmission mechanisms in the context of Chinese shadow banking.
Shadow banking, defined as 'credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system', 120 is a product of China's successful economic transition. According to an investigation report issued by the Brookings Institution, the size of China's shadow banking industry is estimated to be approximately RMB 25 trillion as of the end of 2013, or about 43% of China's GDP. 121 Shadow banking in China, as with many other economies, functionally plays a positive role in facilitating credit distribution as it provides credit for persons who otherwise would not be able to do so in formal banking markets. 122 Shadow banks bear and then allocate risks; but unlike formal banks, they do not enjoy the privilege of being supported by the government through deposit insurance or other mechanisms to prevent financial meltdown.
Great systemic risks exist in China's banking system owing to the interconnection between formal and shadow banks, and such risks would be amplified by financial innovation that allows shadow banks to reach massive amounts of investors, creating bank-like risks. 123 In fact, China's cash-rich SOEs dominate the shadow banking market today. 124 Large SOEs have been directly involved in lending business through their financial arms in shadow banking markets. 125 Local governments have been involved through their special financing vehicles, with which they raised and bundled bank loans and other forms of financing by using budgetary and off-budget revenues as equity and as collateral (such as revenues from land sale or state-owned land as collateral). 126 The blurred boundaries between SOEs and local governments mean that governments also act as shadow lenders.
The key transmission mechanisms lie in the interconnection and interdependence between China's formal banks, SOEs, and the capital-hungry private sector under the financial repression. A typical deal structure can illustrate the structure of shadow banking in China. A shadow bank, usually affiliated with SOEs and banks, may securitize its affiliates' loan credits and issue debt securities underlying an isolated pool of such credits to be sold to investors. Such kind of securitization is a substitute for traditional banking in that it provides financing for borrowers by re-lending the funds provided by the investors of the debt securities. In China, the sale process could involve an underwriting procedure similar to market practices seen in normal capital market deals. Formal state banks may be involved as an underwriter. 127 In this way, it is difficult for lay investors to understand the differences between financial products offered by formal banks, on the one hand, and shadow banks, on the other, as they are all sold by reputable state-owned banks.
128 Bank-like systemic risks are created as a result.
In such transaction structures, cross-guarantees are usually involved between SOEs, local governments, affiliated trust companies, and the shadow bank units. 129 Consequently, this business model is no longer the one used by simple mom-and-pop businesses. We are starting to see complex transaction structures involving securitization that can promote procyclicality and regulatory arbitrage. 130 One recent example is the 2017 debt crisis in Zouping, a fast booming city where some of China's largest private firms are located. Due to the cross-guarantee between local firms, banks, and governmental agencies provided for one another's borrowings, a single local company's liquidity crunch rippled across the entire city due to crossdefaults triggered. This typical systemic crisis resulted in a desperate takeover of the firm after the central government intervened. 131 The conventional view that recognizes the positive function of shadow banking more or less presumes a clear distinction between formal and shadow banking; however, this is no longer true in China.
Information technology has also revolutionized the shadow banking industry in China, which has become a globally leading player of the e-payment and e-settlement markets. Peer-to-peer lending has enabled shadow banking institutions to reach a very large number of users in a short period of time. 132 Alibaba.com, the Chinese online retailer giant, launched in 2013 Yu'e Bao (or, Leftover Treasure) that offered online savings and lending services with an interest rate double that offered at formal banks. In early 2017, Yu'e Bao, a shadow bank by nature, has overtaken JP Morgan's US government money market fund and has become the largest money-market fund in the world. 133 Moreover, the thriving shadow banking industry in China is also associated with capital controls, in that capital controls limit the investment opportunity and therefore incentivize capital-rich entities to invest in shadow banking industry. As such, prematurely lifting capital controls would trigger capital flight and drain liquidity from the shadow banking sector. This was precisely the case in 2015 and 2016 when capital flights reached a record high following the rapid implementation of the Scheme.
Unfortunately, untangling the relationship between SOEs, state-owned banks, local governments, and shadow banks will be difficult. A quick and outright demolishment of this informal market may immediately trigger a credit crunch. However, slowly dismantling this state of affairs may also ignite a crisis from accumulated systemic risks. Any solution must not only take into account institutional architecture, but also the overall political economy and industrial policies. In other words, it requires the timeline of the Scheme to be determined macroprudentially based on the sequence and progress of various domestic reforms, instead of merely aiming for overseas success.
IV. CHINA'S RESPONSIBILITY IN RELATION TO ISSUING
INTERNATIONAL RESERVE CURRENCY The rapid progress of the Scheme can be partially attributed to the global frustration with the dominance of the USD. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis has illuminated the potential for foreign countries to be trapped by the institutional flaws and systemic risks originating from the USA due to the USD's monopoly. During the crisis, as the USD remained the safest means of hedging risk and storing values, foreign investors were forced to increase their USD holdings, thereby subjecting the value of their assets to the US's expansionary monetary policy and depreciation of the USD at the time. 134 As a result, many countries such as India, France, and Russia began to seriously consider the RMB as a possible alternative to the greenback. 135 The other source of discontent with the USD's dominance is the US's extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign financial institutions, which is based on the USD's centrality in the global financial network. Standard Chartered Bank, HSBC, and BNP Paribas are a few of the foreign institutions that have recently been sanctioned by US authorities for allegedly providing dollar-based financial services to clients blacklisted by the US. 136 This has infuriated central and private bankers, as well as politicians in the foreign countries. 137 Similarly, after Russia's invasion of Crimea and the subsequent destabilization of Ukraine, the US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions in 2014 prohibiting US persons from providing financing to several major Russian companies, limiting their access to the USD-based capital markets. caused the value of the ruble to plunge, and exerted liquidity pressure on the sanctioned entities. 139 In response, Russia tried to circumvent the sanctions by encouraging more Russian companies to use the RMB and, consequently, the yuan-ruble trade on the Moscow Exchange jumped 10-fold in the same year. 140 Ironically, the RMB's international success can be attributed to the global discontent with the USD, even though Beijing intended for the Scheme to enable the RMB to become as prestigious as the USD. Against this backdrop, China needs to consider its duties in the long run amid the ascendance of the RMB, or a backlash against the RMB might occurÀas has been the case with the USD. This section discusses China's responsibilities along the lines of the forgoing two sources of discontent with the USD's dominance: (A) macroprudential responsibility and (B) extraterritoriality.
A. Macroprudential responsibility Issuers of international currency should be obliged to bear higher macroprudential responsibility and obligation in light of the prestige conferred upon them. International finance is legally constructed through numerous contractual relationships surrounding key market players. However, as demonstrated by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the stringent enforcement of all such legal commitments without heed of such changes in circumstances would inevitably bring down the financial system. 141 In response to this paradox, the legal enforcement of these obligations is likely to be relaxed or suspended during crises. To make matters worse, the law tends to be applied in a more elastic fashion at the apex of the financial system, rather than its periphery. Surviving a financial crisis therefore depends on how close a country is to the apex. 142 It does not surprise that the USA was granted a great deal of discretion during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, in that it took a relaxed approach to legal enforcement and bailed out selected countries and entities. Hence, it is also fair that any state issuing high-powered currency should accordingly bear a higher responsibility towards the financial system.
As analyzed in Section III (D), the nature of the RMB Scheme is procyclical and is at odds with the countercyclical nature of macroprudential thinking. One recent case in point is the AIIB that aims to fill in the capital gap between what the developing countries need and what the current system (e.g. the World Bank) can offer. The AIIB emphasizes the doctrine of non-interference as opposed to the doctrine of conditionality held by existing international development banks. The practice of conditionality has been criticized as a policy/political tool used by international organizations to reshape the governance of recipient countries. 143 However, the fact that the AIIB has chosen That said, the introduction of countercyclical measures is politically difficult and economically risky in China. 152 The procyclicality of the Scheme, as well as the AIIB, understandably serves to promote China's growth. However, macroprudential policy works by restraining credit available for borrowing and thus may ignite liquidity pressure on SOEs, banks, and local governments that have soft budget constraints and depend on government subsidies. Furthermore, any reform of soft budget constraints is plagued with credibility issuesÀregulators who vow to cut off governmental subsidies often fail to take a firm stance on this issue in practice. 153 These obstacles resonate with the dilemma of macroprudential reforms: on one hand, if reforms are too rapid, they may create a maturity mismatch and ignite systemic risks; on the other, if they are executed too slowly, the accumulation of systemic risk is equally dangerous.
This dilemma has come to the forefront in recent years. For example, local debts have become a pressing issue especially after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis following Beijing's stimulus package. 154 Given the low borrowing costs, local governments and SOEs have relied on debt financing and refinancing, 155 which is arguably less stable than equity financing because creditors, unlike shareholders, can extract repayment irrespective of the firms' actual earning and financial status. 156 As of late 2016, China accounts for more than half of Asia's high-yield bond universe, most of which are for the purpose of debt refinancing. 157 Being aware of the potential risks of local debts, the PBC refused several times to provide bailouts for firms in distress, but eventually yielded to public pressure to intervene.
In the light of the difficulty of implementing market reforms, it is urgent for China to ponder its macroprudential responsibility as an issuer of global currency. The world has sensed the potential wide-spreading turbulence as a result of the RMB's rising status. During the panic caused by China's 2015 stock market crash and resulting RMB depreciation, the governor of Japan's central bank governor suggested that China tighten capital controls in order to stop massive capital flights and stabilize its currencyÀa move that would necessarily reverse the course of the RMB's internationalization. 158 Understandably, Beijing declined to follow this advice, until after the PBC had failed to remedy the situation one year later. 159 As a matter of fact, the Scheme, as well as the AIIB, have the potential to transform the current agenda into one that introduces macroprudential policies both at home and abroad. Establishing a transnational crisis resolution mechanism in the midst of crisis is not easy. 160 There exists an urgent need for such a mechanism as the regional monetary and financial cooperation in Asia remains at the initial stage. China may engage in this crucial task to establish an effective macroprudential supervisory framework. For example, the AIIB could play a positive role in facilitating regional development while improving financial stability. The AIIB can strengthen its regional surveillance capacity to address investment bubbles when they appear, and can also make a good use of its roles as a seller, buyer, guarantor, or insurance provider in the global financial system to stabilize the regional economy.
The global discontent with the USD's dominance demonstrates that the problem did not lie with the USD itself, but the use of any national currency as a reserve currency. 161 In this regard, the AIIB could help to diversify the global investment portfolio. Given that its financial status is backed by Member States, the AIIB has the capacity to issue low-risk bonds, which would be attractive to institutional investors who view the AIIB bonds as an alternative to US Treasury bonds. 162 The AIIB may also run or sponsor (e.g. by lending or providing guarantees) one or more specialized funds similar to private equity funds, that invest in profitable projects in the region, thereby channeling yield-hungry capital away from complex, high-risk financial instruments. 163 Eventually, if these bonds are denominated in RMB and widely circulated in a secondary market, they would diffuse the risk resulting from the ongoing disclosure obligation to Beijing with respect to material corporate information. 167 As the RMB internationalization proceeds, various new infrastructures would naturally impose compliance requirements on financial institutions and individuals extraterritorially. For example, to access and link with CIPS, China's new crossborder inter-bank RMB payment platform, global banks have expressed concern about having to invest heavily in adapting compliance and operating procedures to support the new format. 168 Roughly 300 banks participating in CIPS have undertaken to be subject to PRC jurisdiction with respect to any RMB clearing matter under CIPS and to solve any dispute at the People's Courts of China or the China International Business and Trade Arbitration Commission. 169 There are also broader issues of privacy protection and regulation, especially with regards to data collected on financial transactions engaged under CIPS. SWIFT, CIPS's global counterpart and competitor, once allowed the US National Security Agency to access data on trillions in transfers among nearly 8,000 financial institutions on a daily basis. 170 Whether China will pursue extraterritoriality seems to be a foregone conclusion. Given that the USA has used economic and financial clout to further its national interests, it is unrealistic to expect China to behave otherwise. For now, China could have two potential moves: the first option is 'anti-extraterritoriality'Àto challenge the US's extraterritoriality by creating jurisdictional conflicts. The second option is to create China's own extraterritoriality coexisting (if not replacing) that of the USA. As discussed in the next sections, the former has taken place, while the latter remains to be observed.
1. Anti-extraterritoriality of the USA To counter the US's extraterritorial reach, China has demonstrated its intention to reject the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US regulators'. One case in point is a threeyear long jurisdictional dispute between US Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and China's CSRC. In 2012, when the SEC required Chinese accounting firms franchised with the Big Four (i.e. Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG) to submit audit-work papers about their Chinese clients under SEC's investigation, Chinese auditors refused on the ground of compliance with PRC Secrecy Law. 171 Another example is the draft of PRC Foreign Investment Act announced in 2015, which unveils newly proposed legal mechanisms that would fuel jurisdiction
